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Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) build relationships with other firms to achieve 
greater external economies of scale, market strength, or exploit new opportunities. 
Frequently these relationships rely more on social constrains than on formal controls to 
avoid opportunistic behaviour. The aim of this study is primarily investigating the 
functioning of SME’s long-term partnerships. In particular this research analyses the 
most widespread forms of SME’s partnerships and the use of the main elements of formal 
and social control. The general conclusion of this study is that partnerships are an 
important issue for small medium enterprises. Considering the general control 
configuration related to each type of partnership, social aspects prevail. In particular, 
the findings of this suggest that the use of social control in SMEs’ partnerships is 
positively correlated to a good evaluation of the relationship. 
  
_______________________ 
Introduction 
 
The inter-firm networks have been an important topic for many disciplines that have 
studied the firms’ relationships through different perspectives. The different approaches 
have defined a wide range of forms of relationships and their mechanisms, using different 
social and economic dimensions. These varied studies have focused on the strategy field 
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Daboub 2002), entrepreneurship area (Dubini and Alrich 1991), 
industrial districts research (Brusco 1982; Beccattini 1987) and lately in the field of 
innovation theory (Freeman 1991; Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
All the types of partnerships can be seen as a particular form for regulating 
interdependence relationships between firms, which is an alternative of the aggregation of 
these entities within a group.  
In this realm, particularly relevant is the collaboration among small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs build more and tighter relationships with other 
companies to achieve greater external economies of scale, market strength, or exploit new 
opportunities (Rosenfeld 1996).  
Furthermore, SMEs relationships with external individuals who are capable to provide 
information credibility and access to resources may be vital for the survival of the single 
firm (Human and Provan 1997). Frequently these relationships that are created through 
SMEs networks, rely more on social constrains than on formal controls to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour (Saxston 1997). The managers of SMEs rely on unwritten social 
contracts in order to govern partners’ behaviour in these networks. These categories of 
relationships based on social contracts, are more dependent on trust than those regulated 
by high-formalized agreements. At the inter-firm level, trust is a key factor in cooperative 
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relationships (Ring and Van de Ven 1992). Trust is an important issue considered by the 
researchers as it can be effective in reducing concerns about opportunistic behaviour, 
better integrating the partners, and reducing formal contracting (Das and Teng 2001). 
Moreover, social pattern of SMEs partnerships supports trust over opportunism (Ghoshal 
and Moran 1996). 
Referring to these studies, the research tries to analyse the relevance of the factors that 
influence the evaluation and the control in different types of firms’ partnerships. In 
particular the focus was placed on the relevance of formal control elements and the social 
control ones. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Inter-firm Relationships 
 
Small medium firms often recourse to networking activity to compensate for their own 
lack of resources and expertise in several fields, such as innovation processes (Zeng et al. 
2010), international activities (Saxton 1997; Nakos and Brouthers 2008) or accessing to 
bank financing (Le Ngoc and Thang 2009). Research in SME area has widely discussed 
the effects of such relationships on firms’ performance and development. 
The inter-firm collaborations range from an immaterial dimension to a physical one 
(Havnes and Senneseth 2001), whereas a firm, establishing any single alliance, probably 
pursues more than one single aim.     
According to the notion that the type of partnerships created by a firm depend upon 
the firm’s dimensions and growth (Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner 2003), a rich 
literature suggests that SMEs rely basically on the owner-manager’s personal 
relationships (Sawyerr et al. 2003; Butler and Hansen 1991; Daft and Weick 1984). 
Lechner and other authors (Lechner et al. 2006) define such relationships as a social 
network. The key element of a SME’s social network is the access it gives to different 
resources, above all information, since the members of the network can be considered as 
valuable information sources (Dollinger 1985).  
The literature distinguishes between personal and social networks on one hand and 
organizational or inter-firm networks on the other hand (Podolny and Page 1998). The 
first ones are based on information exchanges through inter-personal relationships; the 
second ones are relations between organizations that can have various functions. A 
further type of relationship established by small-medium enterprises are long-term 
partnership with suppliers and clients. Part of the literature considers a high degree of 
closeness to the client as an advantage for the SME, since it enables more personal 
relationships to develop (McAdam 2000). Yet, an excessively tight partnership can drive 
to a limited customer base and consequently to a kind of submission towards the main 
buyers (Oakes and Lee 1999). Relationship marketing provides a different view of long-
term supplier-clients relationships. According to this paradigm, “to be an effective 
competitor (in the global economy) requires one to be a trusted cooperator (in some 
network)” (Morgan and Hunt 1994). From the point of view of the client, several authors 
highlight the strategic importance of attracting, developing and retaining customer 
relationships, both with intermediate and final clients (Berry 1983; Anderson and Narus 
1990). According to commitment-trust theory, in order to engender cooperation with 
clients, suppliers and all the other firm’s stakeholders, commitment and trust are key 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
The implementation of long-term partnerships with clients, suppliers or competitors 
can meet organizational needs of a firm, in particular learning needs. For example, Hamel 
(1991) found that there is a current shift “from traditional cost driven alliances to 
knowledge-intensive alliances, where inter-partner learning is a major objective”. 
Therefore alliances can also be used as a chance to learn new market and technological 
skills and, in general, to acquire a partner’s know-how. Once firms have identified their 
technological competencies and developed the appropriate organizational structure and 
processes to support these, alliances can be addressed to obtain competitive advantages 
inherent their own marketplace. From this point of view, alliances can be created to get 
several goals, as reducing the risk of development or market entry, reaching new markets 
by leveraging co-specialized resources or reducing the time to market. Moreover, greater 
international reach is a common related motive for alliances between competitors, in 
order to develop a market presence in foreign countries. 
Another key reason underlying the implementation of alliances is the reduction of 
costs, related both to technological development of products and to the marketing and 
growth-market-share activities. In this case, the typical objects of the inter-firm alliances 
are achieving scale economies in production or scope economies through the combined 
production of goods in order to saturate the production capacity. 
A wide literature is dedicated to the study of outsourcing activity, often linked to the 
phenomenon of downscaling which leads up firms to improve productive specialization 
or to achieve market niches. A firm can in fact decides to outsource part of its own 
production  to reduce scope or costs, or to focus on the most strategic aspects of its 
business activity. As Suarez-Villa (1998) states, outsourcing has commonly been 
conducted in two ways: “the competitive mode, relying on hierarchical arrangements, 
minimal cost objectives, and on rigid or preordained performance expectations, and a 
cooperative mode, relying on tacit performance agreements, trust, and reciprocal 
adjustment”. This second type of production outsourcing is typical of small firms which, 
creating outsourcing networks with other small firms, reduce the risks connected to inter-
firm disparities. 
Finally, all the illustrated goals underlying the implementation of inter-firm alliances 
can be reached through the creation of ad hoc projects. In fact, firms can enhance 
partnerships which are limited in time since are linked to specific projects, as the creation 
of a temporarily common distribution network or the development of innovative 
products. From the point of view of the exploration-exploitation framework, we could 
affirm that such projects tend towards the exploration dimension when they precede the 
establishment of long-term alliances and regard basically the up-stream activities as the 
development of new products. On the other hand, the projects dedicated to downstream 
activities, as the provisionally sharing of marketing, distribution and sales resources, tend 
towards the exploitation. 
Therefore, even if a predominant motivation is detectable, behind every single 
partnership implemented by a firm there are several reasons which can be strongly 
interrelated one other. 
Moreover, it is possible to identify three hierarchical levels of collaboration: 
relationships, alliances and networks (Tomkins 2001). Several bilateral relationships form 
an alliance; alliances and relationships create in turn a network, in which all the firm’s 
partnerships are nested. This study focuses on the intermediate level of collaboration: the 
alliances, also called partnerships. This choice has been adopted for methodological 
reasons, due in particular to the extension of the sample. In fact, given the high number of 
cases, the unit of analysis is the single firm and its main dyadic partnerships: therefore the 
point of view is that of the single focal firm.  
 
Formal Control in Inter-firm Relationships 
 
Based primarily on the organizational studies and on the theory of transaction costs, a 
rich literature on control mechanisms in inter-organizational relationships (IORs) is 
flourished in the last decades. The main control models proposed by such literature are 
hierarchy-based and market-based. 
In market-based models, the key element of inter-firms’ control is the price, through 
which any firm communicates its own level of productivity and efficiency (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2000; Håkansson and Lind 2004).  
Instead, hierarchy-based models are established on formal contracts defining the 
partner’s expected performance, the rules and standards which frame the partnerships, 
and possible hostage clauses in order to enhance the partner’s compliance to the contract. 
Therefore the contract defines the control areas in which firms carry out partner’s 
performance measurement through different techniques. The principal aim of such 
techniques is gathering information concerning the technical end economic aspects of the 
activities performed and the use of the resources (Håkansson and Lind 2004).  
In the last years some scholars have yet denounced the transaction cost theory’s 
inadequacy to explain the mechanisms of control in inter-organizational relationships 
(Larson 1992; Dekker 2004). There are mainly two reasons behind this statement. On one 
hand, the phenomenon of IORs cover a wide range of heterogeneous forms which can 
pursue a great variety of goals, not necessarily just the reduction of transaction costs. On 
the other hand, this theory mainly focuses on contractual forms of control in IORs, 
lacking the examination of other important mechanisms, as the behaviour control and 
social control.          
According to Caglio and Ditillo (2008), there is in fact a third theoretical paradigm 
underlying inter-firm control. Even if a unique key element is not detectable in such 
paradigm, it is possible to affirm, generally speaking, that a common aspect is the 
recourse to informal-social mechanisms as trust or intense communication.  
With regard to these considerations, a typical division operated by the literature is 
between formal and informal control. Formal control consists of explicit mechanisms 
based on outcome and behaviour control. A typical mechanism of outcome control is 
measuring and monitoring the economic performance of the partnership, while behaviour 
control consists of elements such as reporting activities, cost control or quality control 
(Das and Teng 1998). Informal control relates to implicit mechanisms of control, such as 
“reciprocity norms, reputations, trust, personal relationships and the embeddedness of 
relationships in a social network of current and prior types” (Dekker 2004).     
 This study focuses on the concept of trust, whereas it seems to be the hyphen between 
formal and informal dimensions. In fact, trust is both the output of informative exchanges 
proper of formal control and an important issue of social control.     
In the final analysis, even if the literature has essentially studied if formal control and 
informal control were substitutes or complements (Yuan Li et al. 2009), it is possible to 
affirm that this is not the point. For example, Caglio and Ditillo (2008) state that there is 
not agreement about the nature of the relation between control, expression of formal 
control, and trust, one of the main dimension of the social control: results show both a 
positive correlation in some cases and a negative correlation in others. In particular, Dyer 
argues that the formal control is effective just in the short-term since the environmental 
uncertainty implies repeated adjustments in the long-term, arising the amount of 
transaction costs. As a consequence, social control mechanisms will be more convenient 
in the long-term since they entail a minor investment (Dyer 1997).      
 
Social Control in Inter-firm Relationships 
 
As mentioned before, in inter-firms relationships, trust and control are used for 
managing the risk of opportunistic behaviour, environmental uncertainty and achieving 
cooperative relationships (Das and Teng 1998). The two variables jointly stand out 
against the perceived risk of the partners and are used in their overall management 
control system. Social control, which includes solidarity, information exchange and 
shared values and norms, becomes easier and more effective if there is trust between 
partners (Sengun and Wasti 2009). Trust is an important issue to which scholars have 
paid particular attention referring in particular to the IORs. It is a complex phenomenon 
that can be individuated at the personal, organizational, inter-organizational, and even 
international levels. Referring to the inter-firm level, trust is considered a key element for 
the cooperative relationships (Das and Teng 2001). Many studies argued that minimum 
levels of trust are essential in inter-firm relations (Birnberg 1998), as trust reduces the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour and can increase the predictability of mutual 
behaviour through each partner.  
In particular, in this study we consider trust not as an alternative of control, but as an 
outcome of the relationships social control mechanisms that reinforces trust generating a 
virtuous circle of trust and social control. This happens generally in the long-term 
relationships where trust is formed also based on “emotional bonds” generating the so-
called affected-based trust that promotes the belief that the partners care about the 
relationship and each other (Dooley and Fryxell 1999). As confidence in a partner’s good 
intention increases, there is closer cooperation, a more open information exchange, and a 
deeper commitment between the partners (Fryxell et al. 2002). 
 
Cultural Similarities 
One of the central mechanisms of social control is firm’s culture viewed as a system of 
shared values and norms that delineate right and proper attitudes and behaviours 
(O’Reilly and Chatman 1996). Firm’s culture is a source of control as it individuates the 
process through which organizational members elaborate information and react to the 
environment. These elements outline and enhance the predictability of future behaviour 
of people that voluntary perform actions that are required by other members with the 
same shared values and norms. Another variable to be considered in firms’ partnership is 
similarity between partners, in terms of similar capabilities and processes related to those 
of the partner. For realising successful synergies, firms’ must have similar organization 
processes such as human resource policies and administrative systems. This kind of 
organizational fit, can determinate the level of fruitful synergies, critical for the 
transaction’s success (Saxton 1997).  
 
Reputation 
In relationships with informal contacts where partners communicate their expectations, 
reputation for non-opportunistic behaviour can be an important mechanism for the 
exchange partner’s satisfactory performance. A positive reputation can compensate the 
relational risk of opportunistic behaviours by functioning as a substitute for direct 
experience with a partner. In the cost-benefit analysis, a firm can reduce search and 
monitoring costs associated to operating jointly with a specific reputable company. Asset 
specificity is a good indicator for the firms’ behaviour but it can’t stand alone as firms 
exist in a system of markets (Saxton 1997). The benefits deriving from a good reputation, 
are generally supposed to be extended beyond the conclusion of the single transaction and 
influence the forecast of  the relationships’ overall level of satisfaction. 
 
Trust dimensions  
Given the importance of trust in interorganizational studies, although numerous 
definitions have been offered in the literature, the issue of delineating trust remains 
unsolved. First of all, can an entity like an organisation act as if it exhibits trust? If one 
can talk sensibly about an organisation having a culture, one can talk as if an organisation 
has a degree of trust intensity towards different other organisations (Tomkins 2001). 
Many studies argued that certain minimum levels of trust are essential in inter-firm 
relationships, as trust reduces the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (Birnberg 1998; 
Lanfield-Smith and Smith 2003). Hosmer in his study makes a complete review of trust 
definitions from various approaches investigating the consistencies and differences and 
proposes that trust is based upon an underling assumption of an implicit moral duty. 
Precisely the trust definition proposed as a result of the analysis, declaims:  
“Trust is the expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethically justifiable 
behaviour, that is morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of 
analysis, on the part of the other person, group, or firm in a joint endeavour or economic 
exchange” (Hosmer 1995).  
In firms’ relations dimension, trust is not a tool that can be introduced voluntary in 
transaction, but it can be build up in long-lasting relationships through identifiable 
partners. One of the principal vehicles considered for developing trust among partners, is 
communication and information exchange (Das and Teng 1998). Firms need to gather 
evidence about their partner’s credibility and trustworthiness and experience and 
communication enhance this process. For this reason only the durable relations between 
firms were included in the present study.  
Few studies have investigated trust variables empirically. Butler (1991) in his studies 
provides five specific components of managerial trust used for achieving cooperation in 
relationships. In particular these five specific variables of trust individuated were: 
integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty and openness. In particular: 
• integrity – defined as the result of honesty and fairness of the partner; 
• competence – as technical knowledge and interpersonal skill required to 
achieve the objective of the relation; 
• consistency – coherence to the tacit agreement through all the duration of the 
relationship; 
• loyalty – benevolence or willingness to protect, support and encourage others; 
• openness – tendency to share ideas and information with others. 
Four out of these five variables are based on moral values, which are the main 
mechanisms of social control and precisely – integrity, consistency, loyalty and openness 
(Hosmer 1995).   
Furthermore, another variable that can be considerate as a component of trust is 
tolerance toward the partner. Operating in partnership can raise complexity of the 
management process and tolerance against possible partner’s inaccuracy is an important 
element in the relationships based on trust.       
 
Research Design 
 
The general aim of this study is primarily investigating if Italian small medium firms 
establish long-term partnerships, in other words repeated transactions with other parties 
over an indefinite length of time. Succeeding to this first explorative goal, the second aim 
is analysing the types of the partnerships and the main elements considered in the control 
as a whole.  
In particular the studies tries to answer to the following issue: in long-term 
relationships, given the object of partnering, which are the types of control that small-
medium firms adopt to govern their partnerships? 
With regards to these considerations, operatively two research hypothesis has been 
investigated empirically: 
Hp1: different kinds of partnerships are supported by different types of controls; 
Hp2: the use of social control mechanism can enhance general evaluation on 
partnership and reduce the conflicts between partners. 
It is important to highlight that this study is focused on a precise moment of the 
partnership that we could call t1. T0 could be defined as the initial moment in which a 
firm establishes a relationship after having individuated the main purpose of the 
partnership and after having chosen the distinguishing features of a proper partner 
(among others: professionalism, integrity, economic convenience). Instead T1 is the 
moment in which the relationship can be defined as medium or long-term since it is based 
on frequent and lasting relations and the standards framing the formal and informal 
control processes has been already set.  
 
Sample 
 
In order to achieve the empirical purposes of this study, a questionnaire of ten multiple 
choice has been elaborated. The sample of the study is composed by 582 Italian small 
medium firms, all located in Modena, a province in Emilia Romagna which is famous for 
industrial district. The firms have been selected from a database of firms’ balance sheets 
on the basis of the last declared amount of sales: from 10 to 50 millions of euro in 2008. 
From the starting sample, formed by 582 firms, 219 of them have not been contacted 
since it was not possible to retrieve a mail contact in internet. Therefore the final sample 
is composed by 363 SMEs. The sample is composed by a wide range of economic sectors 
which are represented as follows: 
 
 Industry (51%) 
 Commerce (29%) 
 Food (7%) 
 Services (5%) 
 Transport (4%) 
 Agriculture (2%) 
 Energy (1%) 
 Healthcare (1%) 
 Information technology (less than 1%) 
 
Methodology 
 
The firms were asked to fill-in an online questionnaire, initially through a mail and, in 
a second moment, through a phone reminder. The respondents were 70 therefore the 
answer rate is 19%. Yet 13 out of 70 respondents have been deleted since they gave 
incomplete answers. Out of a first group of 57 accepted respondents, 4 declared their 
companies were not engaged in long term relationships at the moment of the survey. As a 
consequence, just 53 firms were analysed, for a total of 106 relationships (2 partnerships 
for each respondents). 
The composition of the respondents’ set is representative of the sample, since the 
distribution among the different sectors is similar to the entire sample’s distribution: 
 Industry (33%) 
 Commerce (31%) 
 Food (13%) 
 Services 11%) 
 Transport (4%) 
 Agriculture (4%) 
 Energy (2%) 
 Healthcare (2%) 
 Information technology (0) 
The questionnaire was composed by 10 questions investigating the following topics: 
1. respondent’s characteristics (sector, legal structure, organizational 
structure, number of employees, sales); 
2. the establishment or not of partnerships (as a minimum one-year-
relationship); 
3. some characteristics of two principal partners (A and B) of the respondent 
(sector, legal structure, organizational structure, localization, duration and 
frequency of the relation); 
4. the reasons underlying the relationships with each partner (for all the 
reasons individuated the respondents had to give a score of relevance on a five-
point Likert-type scale, whereas 1 = no relevant, 2 = scarcely relevant, 3 = 
relevant on average, 4 = relevant, 5 = very relevant); 
5. the elements of control considered in each relationship (for all the elements 
individuated the respondents had to give a 5-scale score of relevance); 
6. a general evaluation of both the partnerships, (whereas 1 = negative, 2 = 
unsatisfactory, 3 = acceptable, 4 = more than satisfactory, 5 = excellent); 
7. the frequency of conflicts in each relationship, (whereas 1 = almost ever, 2 
= often, 3 = sometimes, 4 = rarely, 5 = never). 
With regard to the fourth point concerning the motivations of the relationship, an 
explanation is necessary. Being this research an explorative study, the partnership’s 
reasons proposed in the survey are quite general and comprehensive. The reasons’ 
categories reflect the initial theoretical framework and are the following ones: 
 establishment of common projects, both productive and commercial (for     
example,innovative products and/or innovative processes development, 
common distribution retail); 
 outsourcing; 
 access to common funding; 
 technological alliances; 
 cost reduction; 
 acquisition of competitive advantages; 
 acquisition of common competences; 
 long-term supplier partnership; 
 long-term client partnership; 
 sharing of information based on interpersonal relationships. 
From now on, partnership’s reasons will be called just partnerships or relationships 
categories. 
Also the point concerning the elements of partnership’s evaluation needs to be 
deepened. The elements which have been proposed in the questionnaire refer basically to 
three dimensions: formal control, social control and cultural control. It is important to 
note that such elements are the foundations on which control instruments are 
implemented. In other words, this study aims to investigate the elements of control rather 
than the control techniques. Moreover, as already said, the attention is focused on a 
precise moment of the relationship rather than on the entire process of construction of the 
partnership. The units of analysis are in fact long-term partnerships (at least one-year-
relation), so it could be assumed that the norms and the elements on which the control 
processes are grounded have been already framed and adapted to the relationship’s 
circumstances.  
The elements of the formal control are: 
 economic performance; 
 quality of the output; 
Therefore, even if formal control mechanisms rely basically on formal contract, the 
study considers more informal elements in order to embrace a wider range of real 
situations. The economic performance is the key element of the formal control and can be 
measured through different techniques, ranging from the inter-firm cost management to 
the inter-firm allocation of the partnership’s economic results. The control of the output 
quality is another element of the formal control and is based on several processes as goal 
setting or performance monitoring. We did not explicit such several techniques since it 
was not the aim of the study.  
The key element of the social control is trust which encourages desirable behaviour 
(Dyer, J.H., Singh, H., 1998). In line with the review of the literature, the concept of trust 
in the partners has been broken up in several components: 
 partner’s competence; 
 partner’s integrity (honesty and fairness); 
 partner’s openness (towards collaboration and information sharing); 
 partner’s loyalty; 
 partner’s tolerance towards partnership’s difficulties and hitches; 
 partner’s reputation; 
Actually, studying the relationship at the moment t1, reputation is seen more a criterion 
of selection than a source of trust. Similarly to formal control, the components of social 
control consider only the elements of control and not the social control mechanisms, as 
joint problem solving, participatory decision making, thorough information exchange, 
and fulfilment of promises (Fryxell, Dooley, and Vryza 2002).   
Finally, the study distinguishes between social control and cultural control since, even 
if such terms are often used synonymously, Ouchi (1979) affirms that cultural control 
requires social agreement on the range of shared beliefs and values. In fact “social 
controls can exist when there is agreement on purposes or outcomes, without there 
necessarily being shared belief systems” (Langfield-Smith 1997). In the light of these 
considerations, the components of the cultural control are: 
 shared social values and norms; 
 cultural similarity. 
In order to verify the coherence between the variables division in the three types of 
control, a factor analysis was performed with SPSS. The results as reported in table 1, 
confirms the grouping of the control variables in the same three categories individuated 
by the literature.  
 
Table 1 
Factor Analysis of the Items Operatizing the Concept of “Control” 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Integrity ,831   
Openness ,795   
Loyalty ,711  ,325 
Tolerance ,665  ,404 
Competence ,651 ,327  
Reputation ,575   
Social Values  ,934  
Cultural Similarity  ,929  
Economic Performance   ,875 
Output Quality   ,859 
aExtraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Factor analysis of the items, operatizing the concept of “control”, produced three 
distinct factors. First, a main factor of six items was associated with social control 
mechanisms (factor 1). A second factor included two items and was associated to cultural 
control (factor 2). The third factor comprised two items and was associated to formal 
control (factor 3). This result is consistent with the theoretical assumptions presented in 
the literature review.   
In conclusion, every respondent individuated its own two main partnerships and, for 
each partnership, gave a score of relevance inherent to the reasons of the relationships. 
Subsequently, the respondents assigned a score of relevance also to the elements of 
control underlying each partnership. Therefore some partnerships can rely on different 
reasons, which, in turn, can be matched with different elements of control. 
The data was first gathered then processed in the following way: 
1. descriptive statistics aimed to individuate the more relevant relationship’s 
reasons categories and the related components of control; 
2. correlation test between each type of relationship and the three types of 
control; 
3. correlation test between types of control and relationship’s performance. 
Data Analysis 
 
General Considerations 
 
In order to verify the partners’ similarities as a source of informal control, the data 
were analysed according to the legal structures of the partners.   
Most of the respondents have corporation’s legal structure. They mainly set 
partnerships with other corporations (91%), followed by cooperatives that also 
collaborate mostly with other cooperatives (90%) and finally limited partnerships that 
mainly set relationships with other firms of the same category (56%) and with 
corporations more than cooperatives. From this analysis an important issue that can be 
underlined concerns the cooperatives. For the growth and development of co-operatives, 
networking represent not only an opportunity among many others, but it is the normal 
way of operating as a result of their solidaristic dimension. The use of networks by co-
ops has been very intensive as a result of the Italian co-operative umbrella organizations. 
In fact the building up of large co-operative corporations was often the result of 
networking (Menzani and Zamagni 2009). 
 
Table 2 
 Partners’ Legal Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test of Hypothesis One 
  
The literature recognizes that IORs may use a wide range of transactions forms and 
can serve a great variety of functions. In the following section the correlation between 
relationship’s functions and implemented types of control is analysed. 
Respondent Partner Data 
 
Cooperative Cooperative 90,91% 
 Limited Partnership 9,09% 
 
Corporation Cooperative 4,88% 
  Corporation 91,46% 
  Limited partnership 3,66% 
 
Limited partnership Cooperative 11,11% 
  Corporation 33,33% 
  Limited partnership 55,56% 
Table 3 
Correlations: Types of Partnerships - Types of Control 
 
Types of 
relationship 
 
Formal control 
Social 
control 
Cultural 
control 
Common projects 
Pearson Correlation ,230* ,290** ,443** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,025 ,006 ,000 
Outsourcing 
Pearson Correlation ,320** ,298** ,200 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,005 ,057 
Technological 
Alliances 
Pearson Correlation ,304** ,422** ,284** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,003 ,000 ,006 
Cost reduction 
Pearson Correlation ,318** ,329** ,167 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,002 ,115 
Competitive 
advantages 
Pearson Correlation ,249* ,474** ,403** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,017 ,000 ,000 
Common 
Competences 
Pearson Correlation ,143 ,349** ,446** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,176 ,001 ,000 
Suppliers’ 
Partnerships 
Pearson Correlation ,131 ,399** ,441** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,217 ,000 ,000 
Clients’ 
Partnerships 
Pearson Correlation ,074 ,215* ,442** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,484 ,048 ,000 
Information 
Sharing 
Pearson Correlation ,187 ,404** ,382** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,072 ,000 ,000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Common Projects 
Considering the correlation between the relationships with the aim to develop common 
projects and the control variables, the most significant control for this partnership was 
individuated for the cultural one. In fact, this factor can be considered as a fundamental 
criterion for the achievement of the common objective set by this category of 
relationships. Moreover, also social control emerges as a highly correlated factor. This 
result can be explained thinking of variables as partner’s competence that can outline and 
enhance the predictability of future behaviour of the partner that performs the actions that 
are required. 
Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is highly correlated primarily to formal control and secondly to social 
control. This result can be clarified thinking of outsourcing as a form of alliance strongly 
linked to the firm’s and partner’s operations. As a consequence, in outsourcing cases the 
main elements of the inter-firm control refer to the operative dimension, in particular to 
the output quality. This result is consistent with other studies on outsourcing alliances 
which demonstrate that “a firm may gain control over the function being outsourced 
through ongoing monitoring of work performance, as…customer satisfaction, delivery 
responsiveness, product quality and cost…” (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003). The 
correlation with the social control can be explained focusing on some items of this factor, 
as for example the importance of the partner’s tolerance towards possible hitches. This 
result can be explained thinking of the timing of the outsourcing process, which is 
embodied in the firm’s workflow as a whole. As a consequence, the outsourcing of some 
firm’s activities requires a great coordination between the outsourcee and the outsourcers. 
A lack of this coordination can imply delays or misunderstandings among partners, 
therefore partner’s tolerance results to be a key element of the relationship. 
 
Technological Alliances and Competitive Advantages Alliances 
It is noteworthy that these kinds of relationships are both correlated with all the types 
of control. The probably reason is that an unambiguous definition of technological and 
competitive alliances has not been established. In fact, the acquisition of competitive 
advantages is a wide aim of inter-firm partnerships which can range from the productive 
dimension to the commercial ones. While, as Nueno and Oosterveld affirm, technological 
alliances can aim to the “integration of technology and marketing; increasing the 
efficiency of the technology function; improving the linkage between R&D and 
manufacturing, and so on”. Probably also the respondents have detected these 
relationships in different ways, assigning different types of control. 
In particular, both these alliances can be based on the sharing of sensitive information 
between partners. This characteristic can explain the prevalence of the use of social 
control in this trust-based relationship.  
 
Cost Reduction   
This type of partnership is supported by formal control and social control. The 
relevance of the latter type of control can be ascribed to the original items composing this 
factor. These items, as partner’s competence and loyalty, refer basically to instrumental 
trust which is required in this kind of relationship. 
 
Common Competences 
The relationships that have the objective to create common competences between 
firms are correlated with social and cultural control. These factors can determine and 
improve further learning embedded in the relationship when partner firms have the same 
cultural frame. In particular, the social control’s item of partner’s tolerance plays a key 
role in this type of relationship. In the case of the creation of common competencies, 
tolerance against the greater complexity caused by the operating in partnership (Tomkins, 
2001), can test the predisposition of the partner to sacrifice its interest on behalf of the 
achievement of the joint result. 
 
Partnerships with Clients and Suppliers 
Partnerships with clients and suppliers show a higher correlation with cultural control, 
followed by the social one. This result is consistent with other studies which state that 
“close relationships with suppliers may involve the sharing of information, joint product 
and process development and joint cost improvement activities, and trust allows such 
alliances to flourish” (Langfield-Smith and Smith 2003). Since the observed partnerships 
are based on long-term relations, an established level of familiarity may have generated 
affected-base trust. 
 
Information Sharing  
The aim of information sharing is predictably correlated to social and cultural control. 
This type of relationship is based on inter-personal ties which are embedded in a common 
cultural context. 
 
Test of Hypothesis two 
 
Generally speaking, social control emerges as a prevalent factor across the several 
analysed partnerships. In order to verify the impact of this type of control on 
partnerships’ performance, each type of control was correlated to the partnership’s 
general evaluation and the level of conflict between partners.   
 
Table 4 
 Correlations: Types of Control – General Evaluation and Level of Conflict 
 
Types of Control  General Evaluation 
Conflicts between 
Partners 
Formal Control Pearson Correlation ,130 ,088 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,183 ,372 
Social Control Pearson Correlation ,320** ,154 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,114 
Cultural Control Pearson Correlation ,217* ,244* 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,025 ,012 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlation test shows that the social control fits with the highest performance 
rated by respondents. Also the cultural control plays a crucial role in mitigating the level 
of conflict between partners. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The general conclusion of this study is that partnerships are an important issue for 
small medium enterprises, since 93% of the respondents declared their companies were 
engaged in long term relationships at the moment of the survey. These partnerships are 
based on frequent contacts and are maintained in the long-term.  
The SMEs establish IORs to pursue several functions, which involve different 
management issues and then imply different control frameworks. The results confirm the 
theoretical assumption that formal control mechanisms are relevant when the relationship 
implies a high level of coordination, as in outsourcing, technological and cost reduction 
alliances. 
Yet, considering the general control configuration related to partnerships, social 
aspects prevail. The importance of social control in SMEs’ partnerships is confirmed by 
its significant relation with a good general evaluation of the partnership.    
In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that social control and formal control are not 
substitutes. In fact, in the long-term, social variables are more relevant since the 
economic targets are supposed to be already consolidated. On the other hand, being the 
social elements the catalyst of long-term relationships, they are continually used and 
monitored in order to support the relationship. 
 
References 
 
Aldrich H., and P. Dubini (1991). “Personal and extended networks are central to the 
entrepreneurial process,” Journal of Business Venturing 6(5), 305-313. 
 
Anderson J. C., J. A. Narus (1990). “A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm 
Working Partnerships,” Journal of Marketing 54, 42-58. 
 
Becattini, G. (1987). Mercato e forze locali: il distretto industrial. Bologna, Italy:Il 
Mulino. 
 
Berry, L. (1983). “Relationship marketing of services—growing interest, emerging 
perspectives,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 23(4), 236-245. 
 
Birnberg, J. (1998). “Control in interfirm cooperative relationship,” Journal of 
Management Studies 35(4), 421-428. 
 
Brusco, S. (1982). “The Emilian Model: Productive Decentralisation and Social 
Integration,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 6, 167-184. 
 
Butler, J., and G. Hansen (1991). “Network Evolution, Entrepreneurial Success, and 
Regional Development,” Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 3(1), 1–16. 
 
Butler, J. K. (1991). “Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: evolution 
of conditions of trust inventory,” Journal of Management 17, 643 – 63. 
 
Caglio, A., and A. Ditillo (2008). “A review and discussion of management control in 
inter-firm relationships: Achievements and future directions,” Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 33, 865-898. 
 
Daboub, A. (2002). “Strategic Alliances, Network Organizations, and Ethical 
Responsibility,” Advanced Management Journal 67(4), 40-48. 
 
Daft, R. and K. Weick (1984). “Toward a Model of Organizations as Interpretation 
Systems,” Academy of Management Review 9(2), 284–95. 
 
Das, T. K., and B. Teng (2001). “Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An 
Integrated Framework,” Organization Studies 22(2), 251-283. 
 
Das, T. K., and B. Teng (1998). “Between trust and control: developing confidence in 
partner cooperation in alliances,” Academy of Management Review 23(3), 491-512.  
 
Dekker, H. (2004). “Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on 
appropriation concerns and coordination requirements,” Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 29, 27-49. 
 
Delmar, F., P. Davidsson, and W. Gartner (2003). “Arriving at the high-growth firm,” 
Journal of Business Venturing 18, 189–216. 
 
Dollinger, M. (1985). “Environmental contacts and financial performance of the small 
firm,” Journal of Small Business Management 23(1), 24–30. 
 
Dooley, R. S. and G. E. Fryxell (1999). “Attaining decision quality and commitment from 
dissent: the moderating effects of competency and loyalty-based trust in strategic 
decision-making,” Academy of Management Journal 42(4), 389–402. 
 
Dyer, J.H. 1997. “Effective interfirm collaboration: How firms minimize transaction 
costs and maximize transaction value,” Strategic Management Journal 18(7), 535–556. 
 
Dyer, J.H., and H. Singh (1998). “The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources 
of interorganizational competitive advantage,” Academy of Management Review 23(4), 
660–679.             
 
Freeman, C. (1991). “Networks of innovators: A synthesis of research issues,” Research 
Policy 20, 499–514. 
 
Fryxell, G.E., R.S. Dooley, and M. Vryza (2002). “After the ink dries: the interaction of 
trust and control in US-based international joint ventures,” Journal of Management 
Studies 39(6), 865–886. 
 
Ghoshal S., and P. Moran (1996). “Bad For Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost 
Theory,” The Academy of Management Review 21(1), 13–47. 
 
Håkansson, H., and J. Lind (2004). “Accounting and network coordination,” Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 29, 51–72. 
 
Hamel, G. (1991). “Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within 
international strategic alliances,” Strategic Management Journal 12, 83–103. 
 
Havnes, P. A. and K. Senneseth (2001). “A Panel Study of Firm Growth Among SMEs in 
Networks,” Small Business Economics 16(4), 293-302. 
 
Hosmer, L. T. (1995). “Trust: The connecting link between organizational theory and 
philosophical ethics,” Academy of Management Journal 20, 379-403. 
 
Human, S.E., and K.G. Provan (1997).  “An emergent theory of structure and outcomes 
in small-firm strategic manufacturing networks,” Academy of Management Journal 40,  
368-403.   
 
Langfield-Smith, K. (1997). “Management control systems and strategy: a critical 
review,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 22(2), 207-232. 
 
Larson, A. (1992). “Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: a study of the governance 
of exchange relationships,” Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 76–104. 
 
Le Ngoc, T.B., and V. N. Thang (2009). “The Impact of Networking on Bank Financing: 
The Case of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Vietnam,” Entrepreneurship: 
Theory & Practice 33(4), 867-887. 
 
Lechner, C., M. Dowling, and I. Welpe (2006). “Firm networks and firm development: 
The role of the relational mix,” Journal of Business Venturing 21, 514– 540. 
 
Li, Y., E. Xie, H. Teo, and M. W. Peng (2010). “Formal control and social control in 
domestic and international buyer-supplier relationships,” Journal of Operations 
Management 28, 333-344. 
 
McAdam, R. (2000). “Quality models in a SME context,” International Journal of 
Quality and Reliability Management 17(3), 305–323. 
 
Menzani, T., and V. Zamagni (2009). “Co-operative networks in the Italian economy,” 
Enterprise and Society 11(1), 98-127. 
 
Morgan, M., and S. Hunt (1994). “The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing,” Journal of Marketing 58(3), 20-38. 
 
Nakos, G., and K. Brouthers (2008). “International alliance commitment and performance 
of small and medium-size enterprises: The mediating role of process control,” Journal of 
International Management 14, 124–137. 
 
Nueno, P., and J. Oosterveld (1988), “Managing Technological Alliances,” Long Range 
Planning 21(3), 11-17. 
 
O'Reilly, C. A., and J. A. Chatman (1996). “Culture and social control: corporation, cults 
and commitment,” Research in Organizational Behaviour 18, 157-200. 
 
Oakes, I., and G. Lee (1999). “Between a rock and a hard place: Some dilemmas for 
smaller component suppliers,” International Journal of Quality and Reliability 
Management 16(3), 252–262. 
 
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). “A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational 
Control Mechanisms,” Management Science 25, 833-849. 
 
Podolny, J., and K. Page (1998). “Network forms of organization,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 24, 57–76. 
 
Rosenfeld, S. A. (1996). “Does Cooperation Enhance Competitiveness? Assessing the 
Impacts of Inter-firm Collaboration,” Research Policy 25, 247-263. 
 
Sawyerr, O.O., J.E. McGee, and M. Peterson (2003). “Perceived Uncertainty and Firm 
Performance in SMEs: The Role of Personal Networks,” International Small Business 
Journal 21(3), 269-289. 
 
Saxton, T. (1997). “The effects of partner relationship characteristics on alliance 
outcomes,” Academy of Management Journal 40, 443–461. 
 
Schilling, M., and C. Phelps (2007). “Interfirm Collaboration Networks: The Impact of 
Large-Scale Network Structure on Firm Innovation,” Management Science 53(7), 1113-
1126. 
 
Sengün, A.E., and S.N. Wasti (2009). “Revisiting trust and control: Influence on 
perceived relationship performance,” International Small Business Journal 27(1), 39-69. 
 
Suarez-Villa, L. (1998). “The Structures of Cooperation: Downscaling, Outsourcing and 
the Networked Alliance,” Small Business Economics 10, 5–16. 
 
Tomkins, C. (2001). “Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances 
and networks,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 26(2), 161-191. 
Van de Ven, A., and P. Ring (1992). “Structuring Cooperative Relationships between 
Organizations,” Strategic Management Journal 13, 483-498.  
 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J., and E. G. J. Vosselman (2000). “Management control of 
interfirm transactional relationships: The case of industrial renovation and maintenance,” 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 25, 51–77. 
 
Zeng, S.X., X.M Xie, and C.M. Tam (2010). “Relationship between cooperation 
networks and innovation performance of SMEs,” Technovation 30(3), 181-194.  
 
 
    
